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i. introduction
Artworks, designs and architectural forms situated in public places implicate a number of inter-
ests. There is a public interest, which arises simply by virtue of situating a work in a public place. 
More broadly, there is a public interest that arises from the public investment in the work – in-
vestment both in terms of money and investment in terms of meaning as people identify with and 
relate to a particular work. Public works can become important to individuals as landmarks, icons, 
or locations for significant public or personal events.
As well as the public interest, there are private interests in public art. Most obviously, the artist 
or creator of the work has an interest both economic and moral. The creator has a financial inter-
est in any royalties flowing from commercial exploitation of the work, and also an interest in the 
display, treatment and preservation of the work. Under the Copyright Act 1994, the creator as au-
thor will be first owner of copyright in the work, unless it was made in the course of employment 
or commissioned. The author will also have moral rights in relation to the work. If the author no 
longer owns the copyright, then the owner of the copyright, for example, the person who commis-
sions the work, has rights in the work. If the commissioner of the work is an organisation such as 
a local authority or company, members or stakeholders of the organisation will have an interest 
in the work. In addition, the owner of the land or building on or in which the work is situated 
will also have an interest, and if the land or building is sold the new owners will also acquire that 
interest.
This article considers the application of copyright and designs law to works of public art in 
New Zealand. The range of competing interests in public art, and the range of people with stakes 
in a public art work, produces tensions not easily resolved in a satisfactory way by the law as it 
stands. New Zealand’s copyright and designs regimes do not satisfactorily balance the competing 
interests. Copyright law provides copyright protection for public art, and it provides for limited 
moral rights for the artist. However it provides a blanket exception from protection for artistic 
works on public display, at the expense of the rights of author/creators. Moral rights offer some 
protection, but do not provide adequately for preservation of works, or even for continuing public 
access. This article argues that artistic works on public display are under-protected by the law as 
it stands. A better balance would be struck by introduction of a fair dealing exception to allow for 
fair uses of public art by the public, including reasonable non-competing uses of a commercial 
nature. This would be preferable to the blanket exception currently offered, which can permit un-
reasonable as well as reasonable uses. A strengthened moral rights framework would also assist in 
protecting artists’ rights and in preserving works and public access to those works.
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ii. copyright protection And the exception for 
Artistic worKs on puBlic displAy
Under the New Zealand Copyright Act 1994, copyright subsists in original artistic works.1 Section 
2 of the Act provides that ‘Artistic work’:
(a) Means –
(i) A graphic work, photograph, sculpture, collage, or model, irrespective of artistic quality; or
(ii) A work of architecture, being a building or a model for a building; or
(iii) A work of artistic craftsmanship, not falling within subparagraph (i) or subparagraph (ii) of 
this definition; but
(b) Does not include a layout design or an integrated circuit within the meaning of section 2 of the Lay-
out Designs Act 1994.2
The definition of artistic work means that copyright protects an enormously wide range of sub-
ject-matter, including sculptures and buildings, and also drawings and plans, casts and models for 
works such as sculptures and buildings. Works such as sculptures, murals and buildings, which 
may be situated in public places and/or constitute public art are therefore protected as copyright 
works under the Act. In New Zealand, the definition of artistic works is broad enough to also 
cover more functional works that might be situated in public places, such as outdoor furniture or 
playground equipment. The definition of artistic work will cover not only the work of public art 
itself, but also any works created in preparation for creating the work, for example drawings for 
a sculpture or functional work, or plans for a building, all of which will be protected as graphic 
works.
The Copyright Act provides that, where copyright subsists in a work, the owner of the copy-
right has a number of exclusive rights in relation to that work. The exclusive rights of the copy-
right owner are set out in s 16.
16. Acts restricted by copyright –
(1) The owner of the copyright in a work has the exclusive right to do, in accordance with sections 0–4 
of this Act, the following acts in New Zealand:
(a) To copy the work:
(b) To issue copies of the work to the public, whether by sale or otherwise:
(c) To perform the work in public:
1 Copyright Act 1994 s 14.
2 Section 2 further provides that:
‘Graphic work’ includes –
(a) Any painting, drawing, diagram, map, chart, or plan; and
(b) Any engraving, etching, lithograph, woodcut, print, or similar work.
‘Photograph’ means a recording of light or other radiation on any medium on which an image is produced or from which 
an image may by any means be produced; but does not include a film or part of a film.
‘Sculpture’ includes a cast or model made for purposes of sculpture.
‘Building’ includes –
(a) Any fixed structure; and
(b) A part of a building or fixed structure.
 The Copyright (New Technologies and Performers’ Rights) Amendment Bill, cl 11, currently before Parliament, 
would amend section 16 by repealing s 16(1)(f) and substituting the following paragraph: ‘(f) to communicate the 
work to the public:’
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(d) To play the work in public:
(e) To show the work in public:
(f) To broadcast the work or include the work in a cable programme service:
(g) To make an adaptation of the work:
(h) To do any of the acts referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of this subsection in relation to 
an adaptation of the work:
(i) To authorise another person to do any of the acts referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (h) of 
this subsection.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section applies subject to Parts III and VIII of this Act.
Copyright is infringed when a person does, other than pursuant to a copyright licence, any of the 
restricted acts which are the exclusive right of the copyright owner. Infringement includes doing 
the restricted act in relation to the work as a whole or in relation to a substantial part of the work, 
and it can be done directly or indirectly.4 Section 29 provides:
29. Infringement of Copyright –
(1) Copyright in a work is infringed by a person who, other than pursuant to a copyright licence, does any 
restricted act.
(2) References in this act to the doing of a restricted act are to the doing of that act –
(a) In relation to the work as a whole or any substantial part of it; and
(b) Either directly or indirectly; –
and it is immaterial whether any intervening acts themselves infringe copyright.
() This part of this Act is subject to Parts III and VIII of this Act.
For works of public art, two of the forms of infringement most likely to be of concern to artists 
and copyright owners are copying,5 and issuing of copies to the public.6
‘Copying’ is defined in s 2.7
‘Copying’ –
(a) Means, in relation to any description of work, reproducing or recording the work in any material form; 
and
(b) Includes, in relation to a literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work, storing the work in any medium 
by any means; and
4 Copyright Act 1994 ss 29 and 16.
5 Copyright Act 1994 s 0 provides:
 0. Infringement by copying –
 The copying of a work is a restricted act in relation to every description of copyright work.
6 Copyright Act 1994 s 1 provides:
 1. Infringement by issue of copies to public –
 The issue of copies of a work to the public is a restricted act in relation to every description of copyright work.
7 Copyright Bill, above n , cl  would amend the definition of copying by:
 Repealing paragraphs (a) and (b) and substituting the following paragraph: ‘(a) means, in relation to any description 
of work, reproducing, recording, or storing the work in any material form (including any digital format), in any me-
dium and by any means; and’
 Repealing paragraph (d) and substituting the following paragraph: ‘(d) includes, in relation to a film or communica-
tion work, the making of a photograph of the whole or any substantial part of any image forming part of the film or 
communication work.’
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(c) Includes, in relation to an artistic work, the making of a copy in  dimensions of a two-dimensional 
work and the making of a copy in 2 dimensions of a three-dimensional work; and
(d) Includes, in relation to a film, television broadcast, or cable programme, the making of a photograph 
of the whole or any substantial part of any image forming part of the film, broadcast, or cable pro-
gramme; –
(e) And ‘copy’ and ‘copies’ have corresponding meanings.
For public art, copying can therefore involve copying a work by making either a two or three 
dimensional copy of it, whether by drawing or photographing it, or by making a similar three di-
mensional work. Under s 29, copying can be of the whole work or a substantial part of the work, 
and can be direct or indirect. Copying of a work of public art would therefore also involve copy-
ing of any underlying works such as drawings or plans on which the work was based.8
Infringement by issuing copies to the public is also relevant to works of public art. Issuing 
copies of a work to the public generally means putting into circulation copies not previously put 
into circulation.9 This can involve copies made directly or indirectly, and includes two dimen-
sional copies, such as photographs, drawings and plans, and three dimensional copies, such as 
replica works.
There are therefore a number of ways by which copyright in public art or artistic works on 
public display can be infringed. However s 7 of the Copyright Act provides an exception to cop-
yright infringement that applies to certain artistic works on public display. Section 7 provides:10
Representation of certain artistic works on public display
(1) This section applies to the following works:
(a) Buildings:
8 Thornton	Hall	Manufacturing	Ltd	v	Shanton	Apparel	Ltd	(No	2) [1989] 1 NZLR 24.
9 Copyright Act 1994 s 9. Meaning of ‘issue to the public’ –
 (1) References in this Act to the issue of copies of a work to the public mean the act of putting into circulation copies 
not previously put into circulation; and do not include the acts of –
 (a) Subsequent distribution or sale of those copies; or
 (b) Subject to subsections (2)and () of this section, subsequent hiring or loan of those copies; or
 (c) Subsequent importation of those copies into New Zealand [; or]
 [(d) Distribution of imported copies that are not infringing copies within the meaning of section 12 subsequent 
 to their importation into New Zealand.]
 (2) The issue of copies of a work to the public, in relation to computer programs, includes the rental of copies of 
computer programs to the public [and rental subsequent to those works having been put into circulation]; but does not 
include any such rental where –
 (a) The computer program is incorporated into any other thing; and
 (b) The rental of the computer program is not the principal purpose or one of the principal purposes of the 
 rental; and
 (c) The computer program cannot readily be copied by the hirer.
 () The issue of copies of a work to the public, in relation to sound recordings and films, includes the rental of copies 
of those works to the public [and rental subsequent to those works having been put into circulation].
10 Copyright Bill above n , clause 42 would amend section 7(2) by repealing paragraph (c) and replacing it with ‘(c) 
communicating to the public a visual image of the work.’ It would also repeal subsection () and replace it with ‘() 
Copyright is not infringed by the issue to the public of copies, or the communication to the public, of anything the 
making of which was, under this section, not an infringement of copyright.’ These changes do not materially alter the 
effect of the section for the purposes of this article.
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(b) Works (being sculptures, models for buildings, or works of artistic craftsmanship) that are per-
manently situated in a public place or in premises open to the public.
(2) Copyright in a work to which this section applies is not infringed by –
(a) Copying the work by making a graphic work representing it; or
(b) Copying the work by making a photograph or film of it; or
(c) Broadcasting, or including in a cable programme, a visual image of the work.
() Copyright is not infringed by the issue to the public of copies, or the broadcasting or inclusion in a ca-
ble programme, of anything whose making was, under this section, not an infringement of copyright.
Section 7 is substantially the same as the equivalent provision in the United Kingdom.11 A ver-
sion of the section appeared in the 1911 UK Act12 and in the 1956 UK Act.1 Section 62 of the 
United Kingdom Act provides:
62. Representation of certain artistic works on public display.
(1) This section applies to –
(a) buildings, and
(b) sculptures, models for buildings and works of artistic craftsmanship, if permanently situated in a 
public place or in premises open to the public.
(2) The copyright in such a work is not infringed by –
(a) making a graphic work representing it,
(b) making a photograph or film of it, or
(c) broadcasting or including in a cable programme service a visual image of it.
() Nor is the copyright infringed by the issue to the public of copies, or the broadcasting or inclusion in 
a cable programme service, of anything whose making was, by virtue of this section, not an infringe-
ment of the copyright.
The purpose of both of these provisions is presumably to allow copying of works and buildings 
where this is incidental to creating a new work in a public place – so that for example it is not 
an infringement to take wedding or holiday photographs depicting friends and family in front of 
a sculpture in a park or in front of a building. Sections 7() and 62() mean that it is also not a 
copyright infringement to photograph these kinds of works and sell the photographs or make and 
sell postcards. Printing drawings or photographs on T-shirts and selling these will also not in-
fringe. It is irrelevant that these are commercial uses; they are still permitted under the exceptions. 
However, the provision does not extend to cover the making of copies in three dimensions beyond 
what is permitted as a graphic work – to copy a sculpture by the making of a new sculpture is 
not permitted. Two dimensional copies only are permitted, so that it is not permissible to make 
what would effectively be a competing work. People can photograph or draw the work, and even 
exploit the work for profit by selling photographs or drawings in any form, but they can’t make a 
three dimensional copy of the work, whether the work be a building, sculpture or functional artis-
tic work such as outdoor furniture or equipment. Derivative works are therefore allowed, but not 
competing works.
11 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), s 62.
12 Copyright Act 1911 (UK) s 2(1) (iii).
1 Copyright Act 1956 (UK) s 9()-(6).
2007	Copyright	Law,	Designs	Law,	&	the	Protection	of	Public	Art	&	Works	on	Public	Display	 8
A.	 Problems	With	the	Section	73	Exception
The rationale for the exception is fairly clear. However the provisions have long been criticized as 
potentially uncertain and anomalous, and possibly unreasonably broad, although few cases have 
reached the courts.14 Four issues (or potential issues) arise in relation to the New Zealand s 7:
1. Commercial	Reproduction
While s 7 provides for an exception to copyright infringement for private use (holiday snaps for 
example), it also allows for commercial reproduction for profit (as in the production of postcards, 
T-shirts or posters). Artists and authors are arguably not adequately protected, in that the provi-
sion not only deprives them of the exclusive right to copy and issue copies to the public, but it also 
deprives them of the exclusive right to commercially exploit their work or license others to do so, 
and therefore receive any financial benefits arising from copyright in the work. In addition, the 
provision deprives authors and artists of the right to decide when and how any such commercial 
exploitation may take place. They not only lose the right to license, they also lose the right to de-
cline to license any such uses.
This concern is illustrated by the New Zealand case Radford	v	Hallensteins	Bros	Ltd.15 The 
plaintiff, John Radford, was a sculptor who had created three large architectural forms, situated 
in a public park, in Auckland. The defendant, Hallensteins, a clothing retail chain, commissioned 
and sold T-shirts on the front of which was a photograph of two of the three forms, along with 
other design elements. The plaintiff brought an unsuccessful action for copyright infringement, 
but the High Court Judge held that s 7 applied and that there was no infringement. The Judge 
considered both s 7 and the English provision s 62 and its antecedents, and commentary thereon. 
He said that s 7:
… sets out to allow members of the public, including players in the market, to copy in two-dimensions 
sculptures permanently in the public domain and even for profit; and it does so by setting aside any copy-
right in the work that the author might otherwise enjoy. However s 7 is interpreted, that clear policy is 
not for compromise.16
The sculptor in that case was understandably aggrieved that Hallensteins were permitted to com-
mercially exploit his copyright work without a license from him, and without his receiving any 
royalties. In addition, the sculptor had been deprived of the opportunity to protect his work from 
being used in this way. Indeed, he has been quoted as saying that he would never have licensed 
the use of his work by the defendant,17 but that the effect of s 7 was that he had no choice. This 
is arguably contrary to the purpose of copyright in protecting creators, and people working in the 
fine arts are generally seen as among those most deserving and in need of copyright protection.
2.	Underlying	Works
It has not been clear from the drafting of the section whether the exception applied to sketches and 
design drawings for the works to which it applies. There has therefore been a question whether 
copyright in the sketches and design drawings may still be infringed even though the copyright 
in the work is not infringed, meaning that the section is effectively meaningless for any work that 
14 See for example the discussion in H Laddie, P Prescott and M Vitoria, The	Modern	Law	of	Copyright	and	Designs 
(2nd ed, 1995) vol 1, 255-6.
15 Radford	v	Hallensteins	Bros	Ltd High Court, Auckland, CIV 2006-404-004881, (Unreported, Keane J, 22 February 
2007).
16 Ibid para 5.
17 J Radford, ‘Artist John Radford Responds: Letter to the Editor’ NZ	Lawyer 61, 0 March 2007, 9.
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was preceded by drawings.18 It is not clear in this regard whether the use of the phrase ‘in such a 
work’ in the UK Act, which is absent in the New Zealand provision, makes any material differ-
ence.19 It seems more likely that it does not, and that both the UK and New Zealand provisions ap-
ply to buildings, sculptures, models for buildings and works of artistic craftsmanship. On its face, 
the provision does not cover drawings. At best, these are covered by implication.
This issue also arose in the case of Radford. The plaintiff argued that in copying the sculp-
tures, Hallensteins indirectly copied and infringed his copyright in his underlying works, s 7 
notwithstanding. He argued that s 7 did not need to extend to all underlying works in order to be 
effective. He argued that it permitted sculptures in public places to be copied, even for profit, but 
only where there were no underlying works in which copyright inhered, or where copyright had 
expired in the underlying works, or where the copy did not infringe copyright in such underlying 
works.
The Judge held that s 7 set out to allow members of the public, including players in the mar-
ket, to copy in two-dimensions sculptures permanently in the public domain and even for profit;20 
and it did so by setting aside any copyright in the work that the author might otherwise enjoy. 
He said that the interpretation argued for by Mr Radford did not allow s 7 that scope and effect, 
as s 7 would then not protect anyone who copied sculpture in the public domain from any pos-
sible claim in copyright. It would leave them vulnerable to a claim in copyright if they indirectly 
copied any underlying work. It would only protect them where there was no such work, or where 
copyright in it had expired, or where any indirect copy was not a true copy and did not infringe. It 
would erode the immunity s 7 seemingly conferred. He said the argument for interpretation was 
also impractical. Most sculpture permanently in the public domain would express in fully realised 
form some underlying work in which copyright could still inhere. Anyone who copied any such 
sculpture must first discover whether there were underlying works and whether they remained 
subject to copyright, and they must compare the finished with the underlying work to see whether 
any indirect copy of the latter would infringe copyright. This would also erode the immunity sec-
tion7 apparently conferred. He held that, to protect from any claim in copyright anyone who cop-
ied sculpture permanently in the public domain, s 7 must condone indirect copying of underlying 
works whether in two or three dimensions and whether or not they too are in the public domain. 
On this interpretation, s 7 remained a true exception. It only exempted copies of three-dimen-
sional works permanently in the public domain, not works exhibited temporarily, and only two-
dimensional copies. The work itself could not be replicated in three-dimensions, whether directly 
or as a copy of one made in two-dimensions. The governing principle of the 1994 Act thereby 
remained uncompromised.
Before Radford was decided, the uncertainty in the drafting of s 7, and of the equivalent Eng-
lish provision, meant that there was a real question as to whether the exception protected against 
indirect infringement of underlying works.21 The Judge’s interpretation in Radford is at least ar-
guably the one most likely to represent the intentions of the legislature, and it does give efficacy 
to a section that would otherwise have little practical application. It was the apparent intention of 
18 See discussion in Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, above n 14, 255.
19 See discussion in K Garnett, G Davies and G Harbottle, Copinger	and	Skone	James	on	Copyright (15th ed, 2005) vol 
1, 558-9.
20 Radford	above n 15	paras 5–9.
21 See L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual	Property	Law (2nd ed, 2004) 217, Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, above n 14, 
255, Garnett, Davies and Harbottle, above n 19, 558-9.
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the Legislature, and is clearly practical, to allow for two dimensional reproduction of works on 
public display (there is perhaps some confusion in the Judge’s reference to the ‘public domain’ 
in this context), so that people can take photographs or produce postcards. However the effect of 
the exception in allowing multiple copies for commercial purposes is arguably beyond what was 
intended, and also beyond what might be seen as a fair use in other circumstances.
.	Meaning	of	‘permanently	situated	in	a	public	place	or	in	premises	open	to	the	public’.
Section 7 covers works that are permanently situated in a public place or in premises open to 
the public. This means that either private or commercial copying within the section of artworks 
permanently situated in art galleries or museums will not infringe copyright, and copies may be is-
sued to the public. There is an area of uncertainty in relation to works that are permanently situated 
in a public place or in premises open to the public. There remain questions about what constitutes 
being ‘permanently situated in premises open to the public’. It is not clear exactly what would be 
required for a work to be ‘permanently situated’, and it is not entirely clear when premises would 
be regarded as ‘open to the public’. There are also related questions about the ability of owners 
of the premises open to the public in which works are permanently situated to restrict the right to 
copy. Owners of the premises may be able to impose contractual conditions restricting copying as 
a condition of entering the premises, and this is in fact common practice in art galleries.22 How-
ever these issues all remain untested.
Where works are held to be works that are permanently situated in a public place or in premis-
es open to the public, and the section therefore applies, the effect will be that photographs or 
drawings of artworks in art galleries or museums could be made, reproduced in multiple copies 
(including copied onto posters or T-shirts, or internet sites) and sold for profit without infringing 
the artist’s copyright. It is understandable that artists would regard this as an unreasonable restric-
tion of their exclusive rights under copyright, and as unfair exploitation of their work. Once again, 
artists would lose not only the opportunity to license and collect royalties, but also the opportunity 
to decline to license uses of their works that they regarded as inappropriate or undesirable, or 
potentially damaging to the market for their work. The section also does not require that works 
permanently situated in a public place or in premises open to the public remain so situated or even 
on public display. The section therefore does nothing (and is intended to do nothing) to protect 
and preserve public art works. Artists and creators have an interest in seeing their public art works 
preserved, and displayed, allowing ongoing public access. But there is nothing in s 7 to ensure 
this. The owners of the artwork are free to deal with the work, so long as they do not infringe 
copyright’s economic or moral rights.
The s 7 exception also applies to buildings irrespective of where situated. The buildings do 
not need to be on public display. This means that it is not a copyright infringement to copy a pri-
vate home or building by photograph or graphic work, and copies can be distributed commercial-
ly. This aspect of the provision is less likely to be problematic, and is clearly consistent with the 
purpose of the provision in allowing the public to take photographs and make drawings of works 
in public places, or in this case works visible from public places.
4. Consistency	with	International	Treaty	Obligations
There is an issue as to whether the provisions are consistent with international copyright treaties, 
particularly the obligations under Article 9 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works 1886 (‘Berne’) and under Articles 9 and 1 of the Agreement on Trade-Re-
22 See discussion in Garnett, Davies and Harbottle, above n 19, 558-9.
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lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (‘TRIPS’). The express purpose of Berne is ‘to 
protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary and 
artistic works.’2 Article 9 of Berne provides first for the protection of authors, and then limits the 
scope of exceptions. Article 9 of Berne provides:
Right of Reproduction:
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right of 
authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form.
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such 
works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploi-
tation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author…
Article 9 of TRIPS requires that members should comply with this and other provisions of Berne. 
Article 1 of TRIPS provides:
Limitations and Exceptions
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the right holder.
The effect of both provisions is to allow for limitations and exceptions to copyright only if they 
comply with the three step test, that is, they must be special cases which do not conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
right holder. There is thus a question whether the exception provisions in both the United King-
dom and New Zealand Acts comply with the three step test requirement. First there is an issue 
whether the exceptions apply only to special cases, especially as they are worded so as to grant a 
blanket exception. There is also an issue as to whether they may cover situations in which the ex-
ception from copyright protection conflicts with the normal exploitation of the work and/or unrea-
sonably prejudices the legitimate interests of the right holder. Allowing members of the public to 
take holiday snaps in public places is clearly within the scope of allowable exceptions. However, 
the fact that the exceptions for artistic works on public display allow for commercial exploita-
tion is in itself arguably beyond the scope of exceptions allowed by the three-step test,24 and it 
is certainly arguable that some particular examples of commercial exploitation would go beyond 
this. In Radford,	s	7 was considered in relation to New Zealand’s international obligations under 
Berne and TRIPS.25 The Judge said:
This threefold test for validity expresses accurately, I accept, the duty subscribers to TRIPs assume – to 
be sparing in the exceptions to the protection of copyright that they allow. I have not, however, found 
the test helpful in deciding the ambit of s 7. It is, unavoidably, too abstract. The values on which the 
test relies it does not define and each involves choices. Moreover, the 1994 Act must be presumed to be 
definitive as to what those choices are within New Zealand and is, itself, like TRIPs, a regime of some 
elasticity. Copyright extends potentially, in the 1994 Act, to every phase in the evolution of a work, pro-
tecting the author comprehensively. Yet it does not do so absolutely. 26
2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, Preamble.
24 It appears to be allowed by the European Information Society Directive 2001 Article 5 however. See Garnett, Davies 
and Harbottle, above n 19, 599.
25 Radford	above n 15,	paras 1-22.
26 Radford	above n 15,	paras 19-20.
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The Judge went on to say that s 7 must be assessed against its own singular purpose, and that it 
was better approached by looking first to the English provision on which it was clearly modelled. 
Taking a purposive approach, the Judge found that the use of the work by the defendant was 
covered by the s 7 exception, and that copyright was not therefore infringed. It remains arguable 
however that the use in the Radford fact situation was beyond the scope of allowable exceptions 
under Berne and TRIPS. The artist lost what would otherwise have been an opportunity to li-
cense and receive royalties for a commercial exploitation of the work.27 The loss of an opportunity 
to decline to license a use the artist regarded as inappropriate and unreasonable also potentially 
prejudices the legitimate interests of the artist in this situation. While the Judge did not find the 
three-step test helpful in interpretation of s 7, a more contextual approach looking at Berne as a 
whole might have made it a little more useful. Nevertheless, the Judge’s interpretation of s 7 as 
drafted is at least arguably the one most likely to represent the intentions of the legislature, and it 
does give efficacy to a section that would otherwise have little practical application. However, it 
is also at least arguable that s 7 as currently drafted and as interpreted creates a statutory excep-
tion to copyright protection that goes beyond that permitted under the Berne and TRIPs three-step 
test. In particular, the extent of the exception in allowing multiple copies for commercial purposes 
without reference or royalties to the author does conflict with normal exploitation of the work and 
does unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
Section 7 as drafted, and as interpreted by the High Court in Radford, leaves creators/authors 
of artistic works on public display underprotected. Section 7 allows for many reasonable uses 
by the public of public art. However it also allows for arguably unreasonable uses such as com-
mercial exploitation without recourse to the copyright owner. Section 7 therefore creates a gap 
in copyright protection for a category of copyright owners who are among the most deserving of 
copyright protection. The next sections will consider whether the gap in copyright protection cre-
ated by s 7 can be filled by other regimes such as the moral rights regime in the Copyright Act or 
the Designs Act 195.
iii. MorAl rights protection for Artistic worKs on puBlic displAy
In New Zealand, moral rights provisions are contained in Part IV of the Copyright Act 1994.28 The 
rights provided are as follows:
The right to be identified as an author or director.29
The right to object to derogatory treatment of the work.0
The right to object to false attribution and false representations.1
The right to privacy of certain photographs and films.2
27 The artist also argued that the use had a depreciating effect on the value of a series of one-tenth scale bronzes he had 
made in a limited edition, a number of which he still had to sell.
28 For a broader comparative analysis of public art and moral rights, see V Zlatarski, ‘Moral’ Rights and Other Moral 
Interests: Public Art Law in France, Russia, and the United States’ 2 Colum-VLA	J.L.	&	Arts 201.
29 Provided for in ss 94-97 of the Copyright Act 1994 (NZ).
0 Provided for in ss 98-101 of the Copyright Act 1994 (NZ).
1 Provided for in ss 102-104 of the Copyright Act 1994 (NZ).
2 Provided for in s 105 of the Copyright Act 1994 (NZ).
•
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Under New Zealand law, moral rights are not assignable. However, any of the rights may be 
waived by the right-holder, by an instrument in writing signed by the right-holder.4 New Zea-
land moral rights are limited in duration. They generally expire when the copyright in the work 
expires,5 Infringement of moral rights is actionable by the person entitled to the right, and 
damages and injunction are available remedies. In some circumstances the court may require a 
disclaimer.6
Moral rights in the New Zealand Copyright Act apply to works of public art in the same way 
as to other works, as the economic rights do. Authors of copyright sculptures can, for example, 
object to derogatory treatment of their copyright works if the treatment is prejudicial to their hon-
our or reputation,7 provided the other requirements are satisfied. ‘Derogatory Treatment’ is de-
fined as follows:
(a) The term ‘treatment’ of a work means any addition to, deletion from, alteration to, or adaptation of the 
work, other than
(i) A translation of a literary or dramatic work; or
(ii) An arrangement or transcription of a musical work involving no more than a change of key or 
register; and
(b) The treatment of a work is derogatory if, whether by distortion or mutilation of the work or otherwise, 
the treatment is prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director. 8
There is very little case law on the meaning of derogatory treatment in the New Zealand legis-
lation,9 and also little case law on the equivalent United Kingdom provision.40 Speculation is 
therefore still open on what will or will not constitute ‘treatment’, ‘distortion’ or ‘mutilation’, or 
‘prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director’. In particular, there is continuing 
debate about whether the test for ‘prejudicial to the honour or reputation’ is objective, or whether 
it contains subjective elements.41 ‘Treatment’ as defined will not necessarily cover all activities 
that might be prejudicial to honour or reputation, and the definition is narrower than the language 
 Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s 118.
4 Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s 107(2). The provision for waiver is at odds with the civil law moral rights tradition, and 
waiver does not appear to have been envisaged by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, although the provision does 
not expressly require that the rights be inalienable. The waiver provisions are therefore subject to criticism as un-
dermining the very rationale for, and usefulness of, moral rights. According to Dworkin, ‘the existence of an uncon-
trolled power to ‘agree’ to waive moral rights calls into question the effectiveness of the entire code of moral rights.’ 
G Dworkin ‘Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries’ (1994) 5 AIPJ 5, 28.
5 Copyright Act 1994 s 106(1). The right to object to false attribution and false representations however expires twenty 
years after the death of the author.
6 Copyright Act 1994 s 125.
7 Copyright Act 1994 s 98. This was argued in Mitre 10	(New	Zealand)	Ltd	v	Benchmark Building	Supplies	Ltd [2004] 
1 NZLR 26 (CA), although the argument was unsuccessful because it was brought by the owners rather than the au-
thors of the copyright work.
8 Copyright Act 1994 s 98(1). This definition of treatment is narrower than the Berne Convention approach in Article 
6bis which refers to any ‘derogatory action’. See discussion in Bently and Sherman above n 21, 24-5.
9 The New Zealand Court of Appeal has observed that ‘The moral rights of authors are provided to enable authors to 
protect the integrity of their works even though ownership passes to others.’ Mitre	10	above n 7, 4.
40 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), s 80.
41 The Canadian case Snow	v	The	Eaton	Centre (1982) 70 CPR (2d) 105 (Canada) suggested a subjective element, 
whereas there is British authority to suggest the test is objective. Tidy	v	Trustees	of	 the	Natural	History	Museum 
[1998] 9 IPR 501.
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in Article 6bis of Berne which refers to ‘any … derogatory action.’42 Association of a work with 
offensive material is probably not covered by ‘treatment’ as defined. Removing a work from pub-
lic display so that public access is denied is probably not covered by ‘treatment’ either.
The plaintiff in Radford claimed that the defendant Hallensteins had breached his moral rights 
by setting his sculptures on the T-shirt in a context that was incongruous, distorting and deroga-
tory. This claim has not yet been determined. The plaintiff has said that he is fighting the case:
… to protest about what I feel has been the careless commercial exploitation of my art work and damage 
to my reputation…I believe that having cheap, distorted screen prints of the largest works I have ever cre-
ated appear on an unknown number of $16.95 T-shirts … has put into action a chest-mounted billboard 
campaign associating my work with the Hallensteins’ Planet 8 brand. 4
The plaintiff in a case such as Radford	would generally need to show that reproduction of the 
work constituted a ‘treatment’. Any doubt that the right to object to derogatory treatment extends 
to cover Radford-type facts is removed by the application of s 99. Section 99(2) of the Act pro-
vides that, in the case of an artistic work, the right to object to derogatory treatment is infringed 
by a person who:
(a) Publishes commercially or exhibits in public a derogatory treatment of the work, or broadcasts or 
includes in a cable programme a visual image of a derogatory treatment of the work; or
(b) Shows in public a film that includes a visual image of a derogatory treatment of the work or issues to 
the public copies of such a film; or
(c) In the case of –
(i) A sculpture; or
(ii) A work of architecture in the form of a model for a building; or
(iii) A work of artistic craftsmanship, –
 issues to the public copies of a graphic work representing, or of a photograph of, a derogatory 
treatment of the work.44
Section 99() however provides that the same protection does not extend to buildings. It 
provides:
() Subsection (2) of this section does not apply to a work of architecture in the form of a building; but 
where the author of such a work is identified on the building and it is the subject of derogatory treatment 
the author has the right to require the identification to be removed.
The issue then will be whether the treatment is derogatory, which it will be if, whether by distor-
tion or mutilation of the work or otherwise, the treatment is prejudicial to the honour or reputation 
of the author or director. The plaintiff asserts that the T-shirt design is a distortion of his work, and 
that he feels that there has been damage to his reputation, which would be enough on a purely sub-
jective test, but he will likely also need to show prejudice to his honour or reputation objectively 
assessed. Association of the work with the brand is unlikely alone be enough for derogatory treat-
ment, but it may support a claim under the Fair Trading Act 1986.
The moral rights provisions therefore have the potential to offer some protection to artists and 
architects who have created works on public display that are covered by s 7, although the protec-
tion is limited for buildings. There still remains some uncertainty about the scope of the rights, 
and the fact that they may be waived considerably undermines their effectiveness in protecting 
42 See discussion in Bently and Sherman above n 21, 244.
4 Radford, above n 17, 9.
44 See also Copyright Act 1994 s 99(6).
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artists. Artists commonly enter into contracts to sell artwork from a position of unequal bargaining 
power, and they may be pressured to waive their rights at the time a work is sold. Moral rights do 
not in themselves resolve all of the difficulties identified in the scope of s 7, and do not ensure 
that a work will be preserved or remain on public display.
iV. designs lAw protection for Artistic worKs on puBlic displAy
In New Zealand, designs are protected by copyright law as artistic works, and can also be pro-
tected by registration of the design under the Designs Act 195. The Act provides protection for 
registered new or original designs,45 and in some cases, this could apply to works of public art or 
works on public display where a design is applied to an article. Under the Designs Act, s 2(1):
‘Design’ means features of shape, configuration, pattern, or ornament applied to an article by any in-
dustrial process or means, being features which in the finished article appeal to and are judged solely by 
the eye; but does not include a method or principle of construction or features of shape or configuration 
which are dictated solely by the function which the article to be made in that shape or configuration has 
to perform.
‘Article’ means any article of manufacture; and includes any part of an article if that part is made and sold 
separately.
The duration of design protection is five years renewable, with a fifteen year maximum.46 The 
rights given by design registration are set out in s 11:
the exclusive right in New Zealand to make or import for sale or for use for the purposes of any trade or 
business, or to sell, hire, or offer for sale or hire, any article in respect of which the design is registered, 
being an article to which the registered design or a design not substantially different from the registered 
design has been applied, and to make anything for enabling any such article to be made as aforesaid, 
whether in New Zealand or elsewhere.
The Designs Act will therefore apply to new or original designs applied to articles, generally 
where the purpose of the design is not purely functional. In practice, a broad range of things can 
be included. Designs for items in public places can clearly be included, whether or not these are 
also protected as artistic works under the Copyright Act. Furniture design is an obvious example 
here, but it will apply to any design applied to articles in public places.
Under the Designs Act, there is no exception provision equivalent to s 7 of the New Zealand 
Copyright Act for artistic works on public display. It will therefore be an infringement to copy a 
design on public display and apply it to an article in respect of which the design is registered and 
to then sell the articles. The Designs Act therefore offers stronger protection than the Copyright 
Act where the work on public display is a registrable design, and is registered. However, many 
of the works covered by the s 7 exception for artistic works on public display will not constitute 
registrable designs, and will not be registered designs. Designs Act protection will only be an op-
tion for some of these works. In addition, New Zealand law generally offers dual protection for 
designs, so that registrable and registered designs are also protected by copyright law, meaning 
that many designers rely on copyright for protection, even where design registration is an option. 
It would therefore be anomalous in policy to require design registration as a means to avoid s 7.
45 Designs Act 195 s 5.
46 Designs Act 195 s 12.
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V. A Better BAlAnce: A fAir deAling exception in copyright lAw 
And strengthened MorAl rights
There remains a gap in protection created by the effect of s 7 of the Copyright Act and the ab-
sence of alternative protection in other regimes. However s 7 does provide an essential exception 
to infringement in some situations for works of public art. There is a public interest in providing 
the public with a form of user right for works of public art. Repeal of s 7 would result in photo-
graphs, postcards or drawings of works of public art constituting copyright infringement. Plainly 
this would be undesirable and unreasonable. However, the section as drafted is a blanket excep-
tion that also allows for multiple copies, commercial exploitation, and uses of a work in circum-
stances that might depreciate the value of the work or that the creator might consider inappropriate 
or find distressing.
It would be preferable if the section provided for some judicial judgment as to whether a par-
ticular dealing with a work under the exception was fair in all of the circumstances. Factors like 
the purpose, extent and character of the use could then be taken into account in light of the pur-
pose of the provision. It might then be possible to distinguish a reproduction of multiple copies 
on T-shirts from the reproduction of photographs and postcards, which uses would be otherwise 
indistinguishable under the exception as currently drafted. There is a need to strike a better bal-
ance by redrafting the s 7 exception as a fair dealing exception.
In New Zealand, users’ rights are set out in the Copyright Act 1994, Part III: Acts Permitted 
in Relation to Copyright Works. Acts permitted are listed in sections 40-9, covering a number 
of activities, many vary narrowly drawn and specific. The more general provisions are the fair 
dealing provisions, which allow for dealing with a copyright work where the dealing is ‘fair’ and 
for a particular allowed purpose. The Copyright Act provides for exceptions from infringement 
for fair dealing for the purposes of criticism, review and news reporting,47 and fair dealing for the 
purposes of research or private study.48 New Zealand has few decided cases on the users’ rights 
provisions,49 but there is also case law on the equivalent English provisions, and on Australian and 
Canadian provisions. Courts generally consider a number of factors in assessing whether a dealing 
is fair. In TVNZ	Ltd	v	Newsmonitor	Services	Ltd50 Blanchard J in the High Court considered fair 
dealing for the purposes of research or private study.51 The Judge said that:
A fair dealing is simply a reasonable use. What is reasonable must be judged by looking at the nature of 
the works themselves and the purpose for which the defendant dealt with them. What is a reasonable use 
of this particular copyrighted material for the purpose of research or private study of the kind being en-
gaged in? The quantity of the material which has been taken, both standing in isolation and as compared 
with the amount of material in the whole of the work, also has to be considered. 52
47 Copyright Act 1994 s 42.
48 Copyright Act 1994 s 4. Section 4() provides that, in determining whether copying constitutes fair dealing for the 
purposes of research or private study, ‘a court shall have regard to (a) the purpose of the copying; and (b) the nature 
of the work copied; and (c) whether the work could have been obtained within a reasonable time at an ordinary com-
mercial price; and (d) the effect of the copying on the potential market for, or value of, the work; and (e) where part 
of a work is copied, the amount and substantiality of the part copied taken in relation to the whole work.’
49 The principal decisions are TVNZ	Ltd	v	Newsmonitor	Services	Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 91and Copyright	Licensing	Ltd	v	
University	of	Auckland	&	Ors	[2002]  NZLR 76 (HC).
50 TVNZ	Ltd	above n 49.
51 Copyright Act 1994 s 4.
52 TVNZ	Ltd	above n 49, 107.
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The Judge also said that in some cases it was necessary to pay regard to any depreciating effect on 
the worth of the plaintiff’s work.5
In	Copyright	Licensing	Ltd	v	University	of	Auckland	&	Ors	 the parties applied to the High 
Court for rulings on provisions in Part III of the Act. In relation to fair dealing, the Judge said:
In Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, rd ed, Butterworths, Lon-
don, 2000 at paragraph 2016, three factors are identified in assessing whether a dealing is a fair dealing:
1. Whether the alleged fair dealings is commercially competing with the copyright proprietor’s exploita-
tion of the copyright work;
2. Whether the work has already been published;
. The amount and importance of the work that has been taken. 54
The Judge said that the question of whether there had been a fair dealing with a work was one to 
be determined on the facts of a particular case.
The English Court of Appeal considered the meaning of ‘fair dealing’ for purposes of criticism 
or review, or reporting current events, in Pro	Sieben	v	Carlton.55 Robert Walker LJ said that fair 
dealing was:
a question of degree … or of fact and impression … The degree to which the challenged use competes 
with exploitation of copyright by the copyright owner is a very important consideration, but not the only 
consideration. The extent of the use is also relevant, but its relevance depends very much on the particular 
circumstances. 56
The Canadian decision in CCH	Canadian	Ltd	v	Law	Society	of	Upper	Canada57	is of particular 
interest in relation to fair dealing as it offers a broad overall framework for interpretation, based 
explicitly on copyright principle. The Canadian provisions are broadly similar to the equivalent 
New Zealand Copyright Act provisions.58 The Supreme Court said that the fair dealing exceptions 
should not be interpreted restrictively as these defences are users’ rights. The Act	did not define 
‘fair’ and whether something was fair was a question of fact. Citing Hubbard	v.	Vosper59	and the 
United States doctrine of fair use,	the Court approved a list of factors as a useful analytical frame-
work to govern determinations of fairness in future cases. The factors to be considered (although 
they would not all arise in every case) in assessing whether a dealing was fair were: (1) the pur-
pose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; () the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives 
to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work.
This fair dealing jurisprudence could usefully be applied to artistic works on public display, 
so that only fair dealing with such works was protected. Whether a dealing was fair would then 
be determined on the facts of the case, considering whether the dealing was reasonable taking into 
account the various relevant factors as discussed. To achieve this, s 7 could be amended to intro-
duce a fair dealing element, so that it no longer grants a blanket exception, irrespective of fairness. 
The section could be amended to read as follows:
5 Ibid.
54 Copyright	Licensing	Ltd	v	University	of	Auckland	&	Ors	[2002] NZLR 76, 82.
55 Pro	Sieben	Media	AG	v	Carlton	UK	Television	Ltd	[1999] 1 WLR 605, [1999] FSR 610.
56 Ibid.
57 CCH	Canadian	Ltd	v	Law	Society	of	Upper	Canada [2004] 1 SCR 9.
58 Copyright Act 1994 ss 42-4.
59 Hubbard	v	Vosper [1972] 1 All E.R. 102 (C.A.), 1027.
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Representation of certain artistic works on public display
(1) This section applies to the following works:
(a) Buildings:
(b) Works (being sculptures, models for buildings, or works of artistic craftsmanship) that are per-
manently situated in a public place or in premises open to the public.
(2) Copyright in a work to which this section applies is not infringed by fair dealing with the work which 
involves –
(a) Copying the work by making a graphic work representing it; or
(b) Copying the work by making a photograph or film of it; or
(c) Broadcasting, or including in a cable programme, a visual image of the work.
(d) Issue to the public of copies, or the broadcasting or inclusion in a cable programme, of anything 
whose making was, under this section, not an infringement of copyright.
In determining, for the purposes of this section, whether a dealing with the work constitutes fair deal-
ing, a court shall have regard to:
(1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; () the amount of the dealing; (4) alterna-
tives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work.
The provision would then provide protection for reasonable uses of the work, but not blanket pro-
tection that would protect every use covered by the section, even large-scale production of multi-
ple copies for commercial gain, where fairness would suggest that a license should be sought. A 
fair dealing exception would also allow for a court to permit otherwise infringing uses of a work 
where an artist chose not to license the use, but where the Court believed there was an overriding 
public interest in allowing the use, for example where a new work was created by a transformative 
use, such as a parody.60
A fair dealing exception for artistic works on public display would offer scope for judicial in-
terpretation of when a dealing was fair, informed by the Berne three step test and informed by the 
jurisprudence on what constitutes a fair dealing.
As amended, a new s 7 would better protect artists/creators rights while also protecting the 
public interests in public art. However, it would still do nothing to protect the public interest in 
preservation of artworks and in continued access to public artworks. This would be better achieved 
(although not ensured) by a strengthened moral rights framework, in which waiver of moral rights 
was no longer available, and in which derogatory treatment was more broadly defined to include 
actions like withdrawing a work from public display.
Vi. conclusion
Section 7 of the Copyright Act is a powerful exception to the copyright protection provided to 
artists, architects and other creators of artistic works on public display. Ironically, these people 
comprise one of the very categories of people copyright law was designed to protect. The gap in 
protection is not adequately filled either by the moral rights provisions in the Copyright Act or by 
the protection offered by the designs regime.
In order to better balance the interests of creators and the public, a redrafting of s 7 is re-
quired. There is a need to strike a balance between the interests of the authors and artists and 
the interests of second-comers or creators of commercial derivative works. Broader public inter-
ests must also be considered. There are public interests in access to and reasonable use of public 
60 See for example Campbell	v	Acuff-Rose	Music,	Inc 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
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works. There is also a public interest in creation and preservation of artworks, and in the creation 
of future works. The law as it stands under-protects artists in some circumstances, to the benefit of 
subsequent commercial users. The artist’s interest is in copyright protection that both provides for 
financial recognition and for protection and preservation of the work. The public interest is also in 
protecting and preserving artworks, and there is an additional public interest in allowing fair uses 
which acknowledge the public nature of the works.
At present, the New Zealand Copyright Act does not satisfactorily balance these competing in-
terests. It provides copyright protection for public art, and it provides for limited, waivable moral 
rights for the artist. However it does not provide adequately for preservation of works, or even 
for continuing public access. In addition, it offers a blanket exception from protection, at the ex-
pense of the rights of authors. A better balance would be struck by introduction of a fair dealing 
exception to allow for fair uses of public art by the public, including reasonable non-competing 
uses of a commercial nature. This would be preferable to the blanket exception currently offered, 
which can permit unreasonable as well as reasonable uses. A strengthened moral rights framework 
would also assist in protecting artists rights while preserving public access.
